Supreme Court gives M&S permission to appeal

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Break clause lease dispute: wider implications

In a long running saga, the Supreme Court has recently given Marks and Spencer permission to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal[i]. The dispute relates to a lease between the parties which was terminated early under a break provision. There were earlier conflicting decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal as to whether M&S were entitled to a refund from their Landlord. The case is likely to have wider importance in view of differing legal interpretations on the importance of “necessity” in relation to terms that should be implied into a contract.

This extends beyond Landlord and Tenant law, and may touch any commercial or other contract. The Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords) deals only with cases which:

“raise an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court at that time, bearing in mind that the matter will already have been the subject of judicial decision and may have already been reviewed on appeal”

 Background

In May 2014 the Court of Appeal held that M&S had no express right to a refund on the exercise of the break clause: any intention should have been set out in express terms if there was to be a refund. No such right could be implied into the contract without express provisions. M&S lost out on their claim for a refund of rent, insurance and car parking charges for the period after the break date. Before M&S could activate the break clause, they were obliged to pay the full quarter’s rent in advance.

The High Court had previously decided that because the break conditions required payment of a penalty by M&S, the parties could not have intended that the Landlord would be entitled to retain the excess rent in addition. Accordingly, the High Court found that there should be an implied term that the excess rent was in fact repayable. This was rejected by the Court of Appeal.

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Issue

The Court of Appeal followed the previous leading case, Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom [2009] UKPC 10. The Privy Council found the test to decide whether a term should be implied as a fact (as opposed to law) into a contract was broadly:

 “Is that what the instrument, read as a whole against the relevant background, reasonably be understood to mean?”

So, in order to be implied, a term must be necessary to achieve the express intention of the parties in the context of the admissible background. The importance of the decision in early 2009 is clear from the fact that it was cited in eight other cases that year.

Next step

The Supreme Court is likely to be considering the extent of inconsistency as to interpretation of the word “necessary” across the board, and the meaning of the word itself in the context of the case. That the Supreme Court has granted permission to appeal suggests that it may be reviewing break conditions in particular, or undertaking a wider analysis of how terms are implied into leases and commercial contracts more generally in order to achieve a just outcome.

No date has yet been fixed for the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Implications

Although the decision will be awaited with interest, this is a timely reminder that, so as to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity, parties should

  • expressly set out their commercial intentions in the written contract
  • consider the likely outcome of events that are described in the contract or are otherwise predictable, and whether these are sufficiently provided for in the contract
  • obviously, leaving matters to chance and calling on the Court to intervene and imply terms much later leads to uncertainty and avoidable expense.

[i] Citation:

Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Limited and another [2014] EWCA Civ 603
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8 Ways to avoid a Business Dispute

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Despite the best of intentions on all sides, disputes can arise when entering in to a new commercial contract or business relationship. According to Government figures, between April and June 2014 a total of 370,744 claims were issued in the Civil Courts (excluding Family Cases). This was a decrease on the previous quarter, but that saw the highest number of claims since 2009. A significant number  relate to business disputes.

From long experience, the following ground rules should help to reduce the risk of things going wrong in a business contract, or if they do, ensure you are in the best position to protect your interests:

1 Contractual Terms

These are key to many disputes, and the outcome of claims often turns on what the contract says. The terms and conditions should be read carefully. Ensure that your terms and conditions are drafted or approved by a specialist contract lawyer with experience of your sector. It is essential that these are regularly reviewed and kept up to date, and of course, that the terms represent your understanding of what has been agreed.

Be careful about negotiations and representations made during pre contractual discussions. Although many statements will be just sales talk, others might be construed as a term of the contract.

2 Entire Agreement

This should ensure that the contract between the parties is contained in a single document. The aim is to prevent extraneous documents or communications being relied on e.g. statements or representations made during pre contract discussions.

3 Exclusion clauses

Exclusion clauses may seek to exclude liability for consequential loss, or limit liability to a specified figure. Consideration should be given to whether these are enforceable:

  • do they apply to the areas of dispute most likely to arise?
  • are they as wide as might be assumed?
  • exclusions of “consequential” or “indirect” losses might not apply to claims for loss of profits or other loss amounting to reasonably foreseeable direct losses, within the reasonable contemplation of the parties when entering in to the contract

NB: Under the “contra preferentum” rule, any contractual term which is unclear is interpreted against the party that wants to rely on it.fun-and-games-until-204943-sfreeimages

4 Deadlines

Be realistic about fixing deadlines and be circumspect about specific dates if possible. If it seems as though a date under a contract might be missed, a revised timetable should be negotiated and recorded in writing, before time runs out. Any such variation of the contract terms should be signed by both sides.

5 Dispute Resolution Clauses

You can specifically set out means of settling disputes before they arise, e.g., good faith negotiations, Alternative Dispute Resolution, or mediation stand every chance of resolving a dispute, whilst preserving relations with the other side. This could be crucial where a valuable supplier or customer is involved. Serious consideration should be given as to whether Arbitration, as opposed to court proceedings should be specified. This may often be inserted, without considering the pros and cons, because Arbitration is not necessarily simpler or cheaper than the courts.

6 Internal Communications

Take care over written internal communications, including by email and on any company and employee’s devices. This applies pre contract, and after the contract has been agreed. If a dispute arises, under the Civil Procedure Pre Action Protocols and court rules, all relevant internal communications have to be disclosed (unless subject to legal advice privilege – where lawyers are already advising as to a dispute).

7 Negotiations

Clear communications with your supplier or customer is essential too. Being assertive but not confrontational and having clear lines of communication can help avoid misunderstandings in the first place that can otherwise lead to disputes. If it transpires that some contractual terms can’t be met, inform those affected as soon as possible.

 

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8 Identify Potential Issues Early

Early dialogue can often resolve problems, and prevent them turning in to a dispute. The party claiming breach of contract will have to prove that they acted reasonably to mitigate their loss. As such, the earlier a potential difficulty is addressed, the better chance of a satisfactory resolution being reached, or losses minimised.

Often a case that ends up in court is due to the potential problem not being identified early on, or not dealt with appropriately. In this way, seemingly innocuous molehills can turn in to mountains.

Whist not advocating full scale crisis management procedures for every teething problem, there should be a routine reporting system enabling potential litigious issues to be reviewed. Although businesses may be reluctant to involve solicitors at the start, in fact reporting at an early stage to in-house or external lawyers would be likely to make the communications privileged from production.
This article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

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Directors Hoodwinked out of €100 million broke duties to their Company

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The High Court has decided that two directors tricked by fraudsters failed in their duties to exercise reasonable skill and care. They paid €100 million of Company money in to a sham investment scheme induced by fraudulent misrepresentations.

Mr Justice Peter Smith said that, like many such fraud cases superficially the document looks technical and highly detailed. On closer reading it is full of incoherent phrases and expressions and is completely meaningless.

It is impossible to overstate the level of incompetence demonstrated by [the Group Legal Counsel’s] evidence at this trial. He did no checks on the background of these people trying to sell this transaction to him…He discovered nothing about the details of the transactions…He accepted without challenge anything they said. Finally in October 2011 he signed away control of €100 million, despite being required never to agree anything like that…He took comfort from documents that were meaningless…If he were uncertain as to the law, he should have obtained advice from somebody else. That is what one would expect of a senior in-house legal counsel who might have knowledge of generalities, but would not necessarily have knowledge of specifics. It is plain that he had no idea what the investments were, but was content to accept the vague descriptions provided by the defendants and fell into the trap of believing in the secrecy of everything.

The Directors committed the Company’s funds in a “ridiculous and reckless” way. It was difficult to understand how the directors had failed to spot the scam: an extremely modest level of probing the deal would have shown that it would fall apart. Their conduct was seriously inadequate regarding the discharge of the duties that they owed to Company as officers and senior employees / directors to perform their duties with reasonable skill and care.

Although this case was decided under Maltese law, the High Court’s conclusion that two directors were in breach of duty is noteworthy. The general application of English law was made clear. Directors in this situation could face personal liability to the Company for losses caused by third party fraudsters.

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However, there was no basis for findings of breach of their fiduciary duty or contributory negligence against them in favour of the Defendant (those involved in the scam). The Judge refused to reduce the damages payable to the Company by the fraudsters. The directors were duped and incompetent; fools not knaves in failing to spot that the scheme was fraudulent and bound to fail.

Director’s Duties

The Companies Act 2006 contains a general statement of directors’ fiduciary and common law duties.

  • S 171 to act within their powers
  • S 172 to promote the success of the company
  • S 173 to exercise independent judgement
  • S 174 to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence
  • S 175 to avoid conflict of interests
  • S 176 not to accept benefits from third parties
  • S 177 to declare an interest in a proposed transaction with the company

The codified duties apply to all directors of a Company (including shadow directors and, in certain circumstances, former directors).

Director’s Potential Liability

This case decided the liabilities between the defrauded Company and the fraudsters. The award against the fraudsters was not reduced due to negligence by the gullible directors. However, it did not decide whether, or how much the directors should reimburse the Company for its losses.  

As here, where a director has broken his duty to exercise reasonable care and skill, but not his fiduciary duties, the court will consider what might have happened had it not been for the director’s breach. The court has to decide whether the Company would have suffered the losses any way. If not, the director may have to compensate the Company for all of its losses caused by his breach of duty to exercise reasonable care and skill

As a matter of public policy, the courts accept Company directors have to make judgments and take risks. Too harsh an approach to directors’ conduct would have a “chilling” effect; it would discourage people either from becoming directors, or make them too risk averse for the good of the business.

Conclusion

Directors who are in breach of duty can ask the court for relief from sanctions on the grounds that they acted honestly, reasonably and that it is fair in all circumstances of the case to relieve him of liability. A director may also be protected from liability by the company ratifiying his conduct. Alternatively, a Directors & Officers’ Insurance Policy may cover the relevant liability. Obviously, all of these are a very poor second best to remaining vigilant and following the old maxim: if it looks too good to be true, it probably is!

Although the case is being appealed, it is a timely reminder of the risks of fraud to which Companies are exposed, the duties on Directors, the consequences of breach and the need for vigilance.

Case:

Group Seven Limited v Allied Investment Corporation Limited and others [2014] EWHC 2046 (Ch).

Link:

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/1509.html

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Companies have Human Rights too!

The High Court has upheld the right of corporations to bring claims under the Human Rights Act.

 

Breyer Group Plc and others v Department of Energy and Climate Change [2014] EWHC 2257

Compensation of £140 million is claimed by the companies against the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) under the review of its solar PV (photovoltaic) feed-in tariff (FITs) scheme.

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The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court had previously decided in Judicial Review proceedings that DECC’s actions were unlawful. The DECC had failed to follow the FITs statutory review procedure for changing tariffs by issuing a consultation on short notice and retrospectively.

     Background

Friends of the Earth and two solar PV companies brought a successful judicial review (JR) challenge to the consultation. The Administrative Court decided that DECC’s proposal to cut FITs on 12 December 2011, 11 days before its consultation on that proposal closed (on 23 December 2011) was unlawful because it breached the statutory scheme for modifying FITs

In the meantime, many proposed smaller solar PV schemes under way were dropped or failed due to the uncertainty created by DECC’s October 2011 consultation announcement and the JR proceedings.

Civil claim for damages

In January 2013, 17 solar PV FITs installation, supplier and developer companies commenced civil proceedings against DECC claiming £140 million of losses resulting from DECC’s FITs 2011-12 solar PV tariff review. The claimants argued that they had been hit by cancelled orders and had to abandon solar PV projects due to DECC’s October 2011 consultation proposals announcement and its breach of the tariff modification procedure under the FITs statutory scheme.

Human Rights Claims

Article 1 of the first Protocol (A1P1) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a qualified right that provides that every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. Therefore, the right extends to companies, because a company is treated at law as having a legal personality.

Because DECC had unlawfully interfered with the claimants’ possessions in breach of A1P1, the claimants are entitled to damages arising from concluded contracts

Contracts and losses protected by A1P1

  • Signed and concluded contracts were assets, and therefore “possessions” under A1P1. They were tangible, assignable and had a present economic value.
  • Unsigned contracts could not be possessions protected by A1P1. There is no authority for the proposition that an unsigned or incomplete contract is an asset. An unsigned or incomplete contract is no contract at all, intangible, non-assignable and absent present economic value.
  • Loss of future income is not a possession protected by A1P1, unless it has already been earned, or is definitively payable.
  • Goodwill may be an asset, and therefore a possession under A1P1, because it has been built up in the past and has a present-day value, as distinct from only being referable to events that may, or may not, happen in the future.
  • Loss of marketable goodwill caused by interference that at the time of the interference can be capitalised is, in principle, protected by A1P1. On the other hand, interference causing only a potential loss of goodwill for the future is a claim for loss of future profit and so not recoverable.

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Decision

Contracts that the claimants had entered into by 31 October 2011 and that were frustrated because of DECC’s October 2011 consultation proposal were an element of the marketable goodwill in the claimants’ businesses. Therefore, these contracts represented a possession protected by A1P1. The claimants could, in principle, recover for the loss of that element of the marketable goodwill in their businesses.

Even if the loss of unsigned or unconcluded contracts damaged the claimants’ goodwill, such losses are losses of future income and therefore not recoverable under A1P1.

As a matter of law and common sense, DECC’s publication of its October 2011 consultation proposal amounted to an interference with “possessions” under A1P1. DECC acted carefully, deliberately and unlawfully. It could not be characterised, as DECC argued, as “merely a proposal”.

Comment

This High Court decision on the preliminary issue is important:

DECC is potentially liable for claims of approximately £140 million due to its failure to comply with the FITs statutory scheme.

It provides a useful analysis of the extent to which commercial contracts and goodwill can be protected by bringing a claim under A1P1.

To establish an A1P1 claim for interference with possessions, it was necessary to show material economic consequences, due to state action.

The UK Government was liable for a Consultation Document, rather than a final decision.

The DECC indicated an intention to appeal.

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Are you a Shadow or de facto director?

Latest Court of Appeal Guidance

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The Court of Appeal has provided guidance for deciding whether someone is a Shadow or de facto director: Smithton Ltd (formerly Hobart Capital Markets Ltd) v Naggar[i]

Under the Companies Act 2006, all duties owed by a director can apply to former directors, de facto directors and “shadow directors”. It is axiomatic that creditors or liquidators will look for someone to sue when a company collapses. Given the various extensions in directors’ duties and liabilities, and widening of the class of persons covered, questions arise e.g. regarding the majority shareholder’s vulnerability, and that of other parties including directors of companies that are directors of a subsidiary.

TERMS

  • De jure Director: A director at Law, registered at Companies House
  • De facto Director: A director in Fact, although not formally appointed, but who behaves as and is taken by the company and other directors to behave as a director
  • Shadow Director: “in accordance with whose directions or instructions the Board is accustomed to act”, not being a professional adviser retained to advise “real influence over the majority of board members”; [ii]

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Group Directors, Private funders and possibly venture capitalists could fall in to the trap of becoming “shadow directors”. What would happen to them on insolvency? This is tempered by such funders commonly requiring a directorship. Following Deverell,[iii] per Morritt J., a “nod and a wink” can amount to an “instruction”. A management consultant,[iv] a parent company,[v] and a “stakeholder”[vi] have all been held to be shadow directors. A bank could be a shadow director for example.

BACKGROUND

The Court of Appeal has upheld the decision of trial judge Rose J that the Defendant Guy Naggar, was not a de facto director or shadow director of Smithton Ltd, (formerly Hobart Capital Markets Ltd). Mr Naggar was a director of Hobart’s former holding company Dawnay Day, which operated under a joint venture agreement. Hobart entered into numerous transactions with clients introduced by Mr Naggar. Following the collapse of Dawnay Day, Hobart suffered losses around £4 million. Hobart sued Mr Naggar, seeking to recoup its losses claimingng an indemnity from him, contending that while he was not a duly appointed director of Hobart, he was a de facto or shadow director of Hobart and had acted in breach of his duties owed to Hobart.

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DECISION

  • The evidence suggested that Mr Nagar was acting as chairman of Dawnay Day, Hobart’s parent company.
  • There was nothing that went beyond the involvement normally expected of someone combining the roles of major client and chairman of the majority shareholder.
  • There was no evidence that Hobart’s board were accustomed to complying with Mr Naggar’s instructions.
  • There was no basis for setting aside the judge’s conclusion that Mr Naggar had been involved with Hobart’s affairs other than in his capacity as a director of Dawnay Day or some other capacity than that of director of Hobart.
  • The judgment of Arden LJ (Elias, Tomlinson LJJ concurring) included points of general principle, applying and reaffirming the leading case of Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Holland[vii]

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

  1. There is no one definitive test whether a person was a de facto director, the question is whether he was part of the corporate governance system of the company and whether he assumed the status and function of a director so as to make himself responsible as if he were a director.
  2. Someone could be a de facto director even where there was no invalid appointment. The question was whether he had assumed responsibility to act as a director, and in what capacity he was acting.
  3. The court had to examine what the director actually did and not any job title.
  4. The court would need to consider the corporate governance structure of the company so as to decide in relation to the company’s business whether the individual’s acts were directorial in nature.
  5. The court should look at the cumulative effect of the activities relied on and should look at all the circumstances in the round.
  6. Whether an individual acted as a director is decided objectively and irrespective of their motivation or belief. A defendant did not avoid liability if he showed that he in good faith thought he was not acting as a director.
  7. Even a single directorial act could lead to liability in an exceptional case
  8. It was also important to look at the acts in their context. Relevant factors included whether
  • the company considered him to be a director and held him out as such
  • third parties considered that he was a director
  • a person was consulted about directorial decisions or his approval did not in general make him a director because he was not making the decision
    1. Acts outside the period when he was said to have been a de facto director might throw light on whether he was a de facto director in the relevant period.
    2. An individual can be both a shadow director and a de facto director at the same time, and there can be overlap.
    3. A de facto or shadow director’s role doesn’t have to cover all the company’s activities.
    4. Whether a person was a de facto or shadow director is a question of fact and degree.

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CONCLUSION

  • Where someone is a director of a holding company which is its subsidiary’s corporate director, provided that what that individual does is wholly within the ambit of his duties and responsibilities as a director of the corporate director/holding company, his acts would not make him a de facto director of that subsidiary (as in the instant case).
  • Groups of companies, directors (and those who may fall within the definition of de facto or shadow director of a holding company) should consider whether the directors of the parent company are an integral part of the subsidiary’s corporate governance and would be exposed to being deemed either de facto or shadow directors, or both.
  • This case helpfully applies the general principles and puts them in context.

 

[i] [2014] EWCA Civ 939

[ii] 251(1) of the Companies Act 2006

[iii] Deverell [2001] Ch. 340 CA (Civ Div

[iv] Tasiban Ltd (No.3), Re [1991] B.C.C. 435; [1991] B.C.L.C. 792 Ch D.

[v] Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd, Re [1994] B.C.C. 161; [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. 180 Ch D

[vi] Deverell [2001] Ch. 340 CA (Civ Div).

[vii] [2010] 1 WLR 2793

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Arbitration: Pros & Cons

 

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Why Arbitrate?

1              The aim of this briefing is to identify the relative advantages and disadvantages of Arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. Arbitration is, justifiably, an increasingly popular method of dealing with disputes, but arbitration is not ideally suited to every situation. This note compares the main features of arbitration with litigation and ADR,  and pinpoints key issues in deciding the most appropriate dispute resolution forum.

2              Typically, the question of whether or not to arbitrate arises at two key stages:

  • When negotiating a contract. The parties may decide to include in their agreement an arbitration clause to cover disputes that arise in the future. Inevitably, the arbitration clause is one of the last terms to be agreed, and there may be a temptation to rush matters to get the deal finalised. Given the far-reaching consequences of agreeing, or failing to agree, an arbitration clause, this temptation is best resisted. It is vital that the pros and cons of arbitration are given proper consideration at the time of contracting.
  • When a dispute has arisen. The decision at this stage is, in one sense, easier because the features of the particular dispute, and its suitability for arbitration, will be clearer. However, it may be more difficult to conclude an agreement to arbitrate if one party has an interest in delaying matters, or perceives a tactical disadvantage in arbitrating.

3              If the parties do decide to enter an arbitration agreement, it is important that it is carefully drafted; further advise as necessary should be taken on individual circumstances.

Arbitration compared with litigation

4              Arbitration can have several advantages over litigation. However, it is important that each perceived advantage is examined carefully in each particular case to assess its weight.

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Enforcement

5              Ease of enforcement is probably the most important factor in favour of arbitration. The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) provides an extensive enforcement regime for international arbitration awards. There is no real equivalent for enforcement of court judgments.

6              If you opt for arbitration principally because of the advantageous enforcement regime, it is important to ensure that you draft the agreement with this in mind. This will usually involve ensuring that the arbitration agreement is in a form that will be recognised as valid in both the seat of the arbitration and the country of enforcement.

Certainty

7              Like a choice of court clause, a well-drafted arbitration agreement introduces a welcome degree of certainty with regard to the forum for resolving disputes. This is particularly attractive where there is a cross-border element to the dispute: the need to consider, or take advice on, the complex rules of private international law governing jurisdiction can be entirely sidestepped.

8              In litigation, disputes over jurisdiction can be expensive and (once appeals are factored in) extremely time-consuming. By contrast, a carefully drafted arbitration agreement should minimise the chances of jurisdictional disputes. Furthermore, if the parties agree to institutional arbitration, or agree that a certain set of rules will apply to their arbitration, this will also ensure a degree of procedural certainty and predictability (By simply referring to the applicable arbitration rules, the parties can inform themselves of what steps they need to take, and when.

9              Of course, disputes relating to jurisdiction and procedure can and do arise in arbitration just as in litigation. But the chances of such disputes can be eliminated or minimised by carefully drafting the arbitration agreement.

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Flexibility

10           A significant advantage of arbitration is the ability to tailor procedures to the needs of a particular dispute. There is great scope for the adoption of innovative, effective and efficient procedures. For example:

  • The parties are generally free to agree a suitable procedure, and are able to influence the procedure much more than is possible in court proceedings.
  • Similarly, the tribunal will give directions that are fine-tuned to the particular dispute so as to ensure its speedy and efficient determination.

Expertise

11           The parties in an arbitration can choose their tribunal. For example, where a dispute raises technical or scientific issues of fact, the parties can choose a tribunal with the relevant technical expertise. Similarly, where a dispute turns on a point of law, they can appoint a lawyer or lawyers. Choosing wisely can save time and money.

Privacy

12           Litigation is rarely private. For example, in England, court trials are usually open to members of the public. The mere fact that a party is involved in English court litigation can be ascertained by a search of publicly available information, and most judgments are publicly available. More importantly, non-parties are permitted to obtain copies of any statements of case, judgments or orders in English litigation (unless the court makes a special order to the contrary – see CPR 5.4C).

13           The relative privacy of arbitration is an attractive feature to many commercial parties. Arbitration hearings are usually held in private, and the fact that a party is involved in arbitral proceedings is not usually in the public domain. Furthermore, English law has also recognised an implied duty of confidentiality which prevents the disclosure to third parties of most documents produced or disclosed in an arbitration, including the statements of case and award. This is in stark contrast to court proceedings.

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14           Note, however, that the precise scope of the duty of confidentiality, and the exceptions to it, may be a matter of argument. If privacy and confidentiality is a particularly important factor consider including an express confidentiality clause in your arbitration agreement.

Neutrality

15           Another important feature of arbitration is the ability of the parties to refer their disputes to a neutral forum. This factor is likely to be particularly important to commercial parties, wary of referring disputes to the “home” courts of their contracting partner. The consensual nature of arbitration means that the parties can ensure that the composition of the tribunal, as well as the seat of the arbitration and the location of any hearing, are neutral. By their choice of the arbitral seat, the parties can also ensure that their arbitration is subject to modern, effective and supportive arbitration law.

Cost

16           Although arbitration is often perceived as being cheaper than litigation, this is not always the case. The parties must pay the tribunal plus any administrative costs (for example, room hire), which may represent a relatively substantial outlay when compared with the cost of court proceedings. The parties must also undertake the practical arrangements and organisation for any hearing.

17           To a large extent, the relative cost of arbitral proceedings depends upon the attitudes of the parties and the tribunal. An experienced tribunal and co-operative parties will often be able to devise procedures that minimise costs. By contrast, where arbitration is conducted as if it were court litigation, or where the tribunal unthinkingly applies the procedure set out in institutional rules without any attempt to modify them, costs can escalate. Do not assume that arbitration necessarily equals cheaper.

 

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Delays

18           Again, this perceived advantage of arbitration is one that needs to be assessed carefully. It is true that, compared with lead times to trial in court, arbitration often represents a speedy method of dispute resolution. However, if the parties opt for a three-man tribunal consisting of three busy and popular arbitrators, there may be a substantial delay before any hearing can be accommodated. Also, because arbitrators’ powers of coercion are much more limited than the courts’, there is greater opportunity for deliberate delays and breaches of procedural deadlines.

19           This works the other way, too: if your chosen strategy is to delay the “day of judgment” for as long as possible, then arbitration may be your best option. It is probably fair to say that institutional arbitration offers the greatest safeguards against delays.

Finality

20           A court judgment will very frequently be subject to appeal(s). By contrast, the opportunities for appealing or otherwise challenging an arbitration award are very much more limited. This is frequently perceived as an advantage to the parties – though, of course, this is questionable if the arbitrator determines a dispute wrongly.

Predictability

21           Although national arbitration laws vary to some extent, there is a significant degree of harmonisation. Many countries have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law; others (like England, Wales and Northern Ireland) have arbitration laws based upon its provisions. There is, therefore, a degree of certainty and predictability with regard to arbitration law that may not apply to the procedural law of national courts.

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When is litigation preferable to arbitration?

22           Notwithstanding the factors identified above, there are certain situations in which litigation will usually be preferable to arbitration. The following analysis focuses primarily on litigation in the English courts: the position may be different if you are seeking to compare arbitration with litigation in a foreign court, in which case advice from a competent foreign lawyer is advisable).

Multiparty disputes

23           The right to arbitrate derives from the arbitration agreement. There is, therefore, no power to join third parties unless all the parties, and the third party, agree. Although joinder may well result in overall savings in costs, parties will often refuse to agree to it for obvious tactical reasons. This means that in multiparty situations, arbitration can be a cumbersome and inconvenient procedure, which carries a risk of inconsistent findings and which may prejudice the chances of settlement.

24           For similar reasons, arbitration cannot easily accommodate class action litigation. ( Note, however, that class arbitration is recognised in the US (though subject to certain restrictions).

Recalcitrant parties

25           Arbitral tribunals’ coercive powers are much more limited than that of a court. Although national courts can sometimes intervene to enforce arbitrators’ procedural orders, delays are still a more distinct possibility in arbitration than in litigation. Some institutions have taken steps to deal with this, but deliberate delaying tactics may be more difficult to combat in arbitration than in litigation.

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Summary determination

26           In principle an arbitral tribunal can determine claims and defences summarily. However, in practice they may be less willing than a court to do so. For example, English courts tend to be robust in disposing of meritless claims or defences on a summary basis. An arbitral tribunal is less likely to adopt such an approach. Therefore, if your claims are simple, involving only one defendant, and are indisputably due, you may prefer to issue court proceedings and apply for summary judgment.

No precedent

27           An arbitration award is for most purposes confidential to the parties. Furthermore, although persuasive, it does not give rise to any binding precedent or res judicata vis a vis other parties. Where, therefore, a final and generally binding ruling on the meaning of a standard form contract is required, litigation in court will be preferable.

Irrelevant evidence

28           The tribunal or parties may decide whether or not to apply the strict rules of evidence. If they decide not to, there is a greater chance of the introduction of prejudicial or irrelevant material. However, this is not usually a problem in practice.

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Arbitration compared with ADR

29           The term “ADR” encompasses so many and varied procedures that it is difficult to generalise about its relative advantages and disadvantages. For present purposes, the following general points may be stated.

 

30           ADR (in particular mediation) enables the parties to reach solutions that are not based on a “win/lose” paradigm, and that promote continuing relationships. As such, ADR may save time and costs by cutting through the legal or technical rights and wrongs, and focusing upon the solution. The flexibility and goal-oriented nature of ADR will be attractive to many parties.

31           However, unless the parties reach a settlement, ADR will not give rise to any binding judgment or award. Parties may withdraw from ADR before reaching any settlement, or the ADR may conclude without any settlement being reached, giving rise in such cases to wasted costs. Furthermore, and by contrast with arbitration, there is at present no statutory regime in support of ADR. Parties who are not comfortable with this relative lack of structure may prefer to arbitrate or litigate, or possibly to adopt two-tiered or hybrid procedures.

Court of Appeal upholds power of English Court to commit a foreign director for contempt

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The Court of Appeal has unanimously upheld the High Court’s decision that the Managing Director of the Claimant (domiciled and resident in Saudi Arabia) could be served with committal proceedings for contempt of cour

BACKGROUND

In the lower court, the Claimant companies obtained a ‘without notice’ injunction against the Defendants. This was cancelled when the judge at first instance found that the Claimant companies were in breach of their obligations to give full disclosure. They had also misled the court and broken an undertaking to preserve evidence. Consequently one of the Defendants asked the court to punish the Claimant companies for contempt of court. Additionally, the Defendant made an application for committal (imprisonment) of  the Claimants’ Managing Director. This was on the basis that he was also in contempt of court , although he was not personally bringing the case in his name. The judge ordered service of the application for contempt on the director out of the jurisdiction.

The director appealed to the Court of Appeal. He argued that the Court had no power to make any order against him because he was outside the territorial jurisdiction.

CASE

Dar Al Arkan Real Estate Development Co & Anor V Al Refai & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 715

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/715.html

 

COMMITTAL

Under CPR r81.4 a committal order can be made against the director of a company which is in breach of a judgment, order or undertaking.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the legislative intention behind the provision must include dealing with contempt of its orders by companies with foreign directors. Although CPR r81.4 does not specifically state that it is effective out of the jurisdiction, if this was not the case, the power of the English courts to ensure compliance with its orders would be

significantly weakened”.

The Court of Appeal distinguished the position where it had previously been decided that the English courts did not have jurisdiction to order the examination of a foreign director of a debtor company under CPR r71. The rationale was the nature of committal proceedings is very different from the power of the court under Part 71 to obtain information from judgment debtors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Judge’s exercise of discretion to allow service out of the jurisdiction of the Notice of Committal. This was because the application constituted a “Claim Form” under the definition in CPR r6 as it commenced “proceedings”.

The Court of Appeal also referred to Article 22(5) of Regulation 44/2001 of the Brussels I Regulation. This states that, in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments, the courts of the Member State in which the judgment has been or is to be enforced shall have exclusive jurisdiction,

regardless of domicile”.

The trial judge held that this Article did not apply because the director was not domiciled in a European Union Member State.

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The judge said that he was bound by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Choudhary & Ors v Bhatter & Ors [2009] EWCA Civ 1176. The Court of Appeal however indicated that, in view of ECJ decisions, there was a “compelling” argument that Choudhary was incorrectly decided and that the English courts did have jurisdiction under the Article, no matter where the defendant is domiciled.

As such, there was no reason not to extend the jurisdictional rule to parties and directors domiciled outside of the EU. Their non-domiciliary status is irrelevant and does not limit the Court’s powers to enforce its orders.

COMMENT

It would have been damaging for compliance with  the Overriding Objectives to deal with cases justly, and unfair if there was a weakened regime  for directors resident abroad, or directors of foreign companies.

The decision shows that the court is prepared to extend the reach of sanctions where this is in the public interest. Ultimately this could result in committal for contempt of court, even for a foreign director,  where there is continued disobedience of a court order.

 

Court of Appeal Decision: Assessing Damages on a Freezing Order Cross-Undertaking

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The Court of Appeal has for the first time given guidance on how damages are to be awarded on a cross-undertaking in damages on a freezing order. This clarifies recent uncertainty on the principles in first instance decisions.

Whenever the Court makes an interim order pending trial, such as a freezing order, search order or injunction, invariably the Court requires an undertaking from the Claimant. This “cross-undertaking” makes the Claimant pay damages to the Defendant if it is later decided that the Claimant should not have been granted the interim order.

The Court of Appeal has reiterated the analogy of contractual principles that should apply to assessment of damages under a cross-undertaking. That is with the proviso that there is in reality no contract and there has to be room for exceptions.

In Abbey Forwarding Ltd (in liquidation) and another v Hone and others (No 3) [2014] EWCA Civ 711; [2014] WLR (D) 236  giving the lead judgment of the Court of Appeal, McCombe LJ held

‘When determining questions of compensation for loss arising as a result of a freezing order and the undertaking in damages therein, the correct approach was that the remote consequences of obtaining an injunction were not to be taken into account in assessing damages but that logical and sensible adjustments might well be required simply because the court was not awarding damages for breach of contract but was compensating for loss caused by the injunction which was wrongly granted.’

This was the correct approach where a Defendant who is the victim of an unfair injunction should be compensated for their loss. However, a Claimant should not be fixed with liabilities that no reasonable person could have foreseen, unless the Claimant knew or ought to have known of other circumstances that were likely to give rise to that type of loss.

Terms such as “common law damages” and “equitable compensation” did not assist.

The aggreived Defendants contended that they had been successful entrepreneurs with a track record of commercial and investment success which had been impeded for some 20 months because of the wrongful freezing order.  On appeal it was confirmed that whilst principles of remoteness of damage in contract ought to apply in the circumstances, there should be flexibility so as to allow logical and sensible adjustments. This was because the Court was not awarding damages for breach of contract, but was compensating for loss caused by the injunction.

Vos LJ added that general damages could also be included within the cross-undertaking in some cases where appropiate, for stress, loss of reputation and general loss of business opportunities and disruption caused by inappropriate policing of the injunction.

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Freezing Injunction: Full & Frank Disclosure – Reflective Loss

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  • For a Freezing injunction, does a Claimant need “much the better of the argument”?
  • On Reflective Loss, what is a “good arguable case”?

Case

Kazakhstan Kagazy and others -v- Arip [2014 EWCA CIV 381]

bit.ly/1s6Jj45

Key Points

  1. On a Freezing injunction, a “good arguable case” is more than barely capable of serious argument, but not necessarily better than 50% prospects of success.
  2. The parent company’s alleged loss was the same as those of its subsidiaries. Under the reflective loss principles the parent company had no good and arguable loss of its own.

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Background

The Court of Appeal has unanimously upheld a freezing injunction in a case involving alleged inter company frauds exceeding $150M.

The Court considered issues relating to limitation, reflective loss, and the obligation on the Claimants to give full and frank disclosure on without notice applications.

The Court of Appeal held that the “good arguable case” was the appropriate test, approving the traditional test laid down by Mustill J in Ninemia Maritime Corporation -v- Trave (The Neidersachsen) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600;

“…in the sense of a case which is more than barley capable of serious argument, and yet not necessarily which the Judge believes to have a better than 50% chance of success…

The injunction had been granted by Judge Mackie QC in the Commercial Court adopting a somewhat higher test requiring the Claimants to show they had “much the better of the argument“.

The Court of Appeal emphasised the wide discretion of the lower Court, including all matters of alleged non-disclosure, and the Judge’s decision was well within the margins of discretion.

The Defendants deny any wrong doing. No defence had yet been required from the Defendants, and Jackson LJ commented that “… it is only by a narrow margin that (the Claimant’s) case is strong enough to support their entitlement to a freezing injunction…“. He referred to “a very real possibility that the Defendants’ limitation defence will prevail at trial on the basis of Kazakh law“. That stipulated a three year limitation period.

Elias LJ said in relation to the alleged non-disclosure and the date of knowledge from when limitation runs

… nobody should allege dishonestly lightly. The Court should not readily conclude that fraud ought to have been apparent unless it is satisfied that the evidence would plainly justify the allegations. That is all  a high hurdle…

It was also pointed our that it is inherently unattractive for the Defendant to submit that the fraud should have been manifestly obvious, and yet at the same time to assert that he had a complete defence to the allegation (on the basis of the proceedings having been issued too late).

Avoid Mini Trial

The Court of Appeal emphasised that applications to discharge freezing injunctions should not turn into mini trials. The High Court had considerable discretion regarding allegations of non-disclosure.

Any failures to give full and frank disclosure were unintentional and ultimately not material. The Court of Appeal commented that the question of when the Claimants had the relevant knowledge, which determines when the limitation period starts should not be usually be decided on an interlocutory basis unless the facts and circumstances were very clear.

Reflective Loss

Although the injunction was upheld for £72M and this stays until the trial, the Defendant was successful in the cross appeal. According to the “reflective loss” principle, a  shareholder cannot recover damages simply on the basis that the company in which the shareholder has an interest has suffered loss. Applying Johnson -v- Gore Wood [2000 UKHL65] Longmoor LJ found that it was well arguable that the claims were not time barred, but if they are, the subsidiaries ought to have been aware that their rights had been violated. In those circumstances the subsidiaries could not say that the inability to sue was no fault of their own. Accordingly, the parent company had no loss independant of the subsidiaries (the other Claimant companies).

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Service of a Claim Form on a Director

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Key issues for company directors from the recent case Key Homes Bradford Ltd and others v Patel [2014] All ER (D) 69:
A recent High Court decision provides a warning to company directors who move abroad without updating their address for service on the register of directors.
The claimants served the claim form on the defendant (a former director of the claimants) by delivering it to two addresses in England, which he had listed on the register of directors. The defendant disputed service on the basis that he was no longer resident in the United Kingdom at the date of service and neither address was his usual or last known residence. The court held that the defendant had been validly served with the claim form at the address listed on the register.

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This decision makes it clear that directors who choose to move abroad without updating their address for service on the register will leave themselves open to be served with proceedings in England, if an English address is still listed.
Section 1140 Companies Act 2006.
This permits a document to be served on a company director by leaving it at or sending it by post to the person’s registered address. This applies whatever the purpose of the document in question. The registered address is the relevant address in the register of directors available for public inspection.
The case is a ground-breaking decision of considerable practical importance. There had been no prior cases considering the application of the section. The High Court decided that section 1140 allows a claimant to serve a company director with proceedings at the director’s registered address in the UK without seeking the court’s permission and regardless of whether (a) the proceedings concern that company or (b) the director resides outside the jurisdiction.
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This means claimants will be entitled to serve on the English address listed on the register and avoid the need to obtain permission to serve outside the jurisdiction. Conversely, any directors moving abroad should check the register so that they are aware of what address is listed. Directors who choose to move abroad without updating their address for service on the register, leave themselves open to be served with proceedings in England, if an English address is still listed by them
Defective Service.
This reminds me of a case where solicitors on the other side made an incorrect assumption that I was acting for both the first defendant (limited company) and second defendant (individual director, sued personally). It was clear however that I only had instructions to accept service on behalf of the limited company. I had to send back the proceedings meant for the Director. The claimants’ attempts at service on him failed, and they were out of time. They were unable to reinstate the proceedings against the director in this multi-million pound claim and the action against him was struck out. The claimants’ solicitors ultimately had to pay costs on that service dispute exceeding £20,000.
J Paul Sykes LLB LLM
First Published February 2014