Latest Court of Appeal Guidance
The Court of Appeal has provided guidance for deciding whether someone is a Shadow or de facto director: Smithton Ltd (formerly Hobart Capital Markets Ltd) v Naggar[i]
Under the Companies Act 2006, all duties owed by a director can apply to former directors, de facto directors and “shadow directors”. It is axiomatic that creditors or liquidators will look for someone to sue when a company collapses. Given the various extensions in directors’ duties and liabilities, and widening of the class of persons covered, questions arise e.g. regarding the majority shareholder’s vulnerability, and that of other parties including directors of companies that are directors of a subsidiary.
- De jure Director: A director at Law, registered at Companies House
- De facto Director: A director in Fact, although not formally appointed, but who behaves as and is taken by the company and other directors to behave as a director
- Shadow Director: “in accordance with whose directions or instructions the Board is accustomed to act”, not being a professional adviser retained to advise “real influence over the majority of board members”; [ii]
Group Directors, Private funders and possibly venture capitalists could fall in to the trap of becoming “shadow directors”. What would happen to them on insolvency? This is tempered by such funders commonly requiring a directorship. Following Deverell,[iii] per Morritt J., a “nod and a wink” can amount to an “instruction”. A management consultant,[iv] a parent company,[v] and a “stakeholder”[vi] have all been held to be shadow directors. A bank could be a shadow director for example.
The Court of Appeal has upheld the decision of trial judge Rose J that the Defendant Guy Naggar, was not a de facto director or shadow director of Smithton Ltd, (formerly Hobart Capital Markets Ltd). Mr Naggar was a director of Hobart’s former holding company Dawnay Day, which operated under a joint venture agreement. Hobart entered into numerous transactions with clients introduced by Mr Naggar. Following the collapse of Dawnay Day, Hobart suffered losses around £4 million. Hobart sued Mr Naggar, seeking to recoup its losses claimingng an indemnity from him, contending that while he was not a duly appointed director of Hobart, he was a de facto or shadow director of Hobart and had acted in breach of his duties owed to Hobart.
- The evidence suggested that Mr Nagar was acting as chairman of Dawnay Day, Hobart’s parent company.
- There was nothing that went beyond the involvement normally expected of someone combining the roles of major client and chairman of the majority shareholder.
- There was no evidence that Hobart’s board were accustomed to complying with Mr Naggar’s instructions.
- There was no basis for setting aside the judge’s conclusion that Mr Naggar had been involved with Hobart’s affairs other than in his capacity as a director of Dawnay Day or some other capacity than that of director of Hobart.
- The judgment of Arden LJ (Elias, Tomlinson LJJ concurring) included points of general principle, applying and reaffirming the leading case of Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Holland[vii]
- There is no one definitive test whether a person was a de facto director, the question is whether he was part of the corporate governance system of the company and whether he assumed the status and function of a director so as to make himself responsible as if he were a director.
- Someone could be a de facto director even where there was no invalid appointment. The question was whether he had assumed responsibility to act as a director, and in what capacity he was acting.
- The court had to examine what the director actually did and not any job title.
- The court would need to consider the corporate governance structure of the company so as to decide in relation to the company’s business whether the individual’s acts were directorial in nature.
- The court should look at the cumulative effect of the activities relied on and should look at all the circumstances in the round.
- Whether an individual acted as a director is decided objectively and irrespective of their motivation or belief. A defendant did not avoid liability if he showed that he in good faith thought he was not acting as a director.
- Even a single directorial act could lead to liability in an exceptional case
- It was also important to look at the acts in their context. Relevant factors included whether
- the company considered him to be a director and held him out as such
- third parties considered that he was a director
- a person was consulted about directorial decisions or his approval did not in general make him a director because he was not making the decision
- Acts outside the period when he was said to have been a de facto director might throw light on whether he was a de facto director in the relevant period.
- An individual can be both a shadow director and a de facto director at the same time, and there can be overlap.
- A de facto or shadow director’s role doesn’t have to cover all the company’s activities.
- Whether a person was a de facto or shadow director is a question of fact and degree.
- Where someone is a director of a holding company which is its subsidiary’s corporate director, provided that what that individual does is wholly within the ambit of his duties and responsibilities as a director of the corporate director/holding company, his acts would not make him a de facto director of that subsidiary (as in the instant case).
- Groups of companies, directors (and those who may fall within the definition of de facto or shadow director of a holding company) should consider whether the directors of the parent company are an integral part of the subsidiary’s corporate governance and would be exposed to being deemed either de facto or shadow directors, or both.
- This case helpfully applies the general principles and puts them in context.
[i]  EWCA Civ 939
[ii] 251(1) of the Companies Act 2006
[iii] Deverell  Ch. 340 CA (Civ Div
[iv] Tasiban Ltd (No.3), Re  B.C.C. 435;  B.C.L.C. 792 Ch D.
[v] Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd, Re  B.C.C. 161;  2 B.C.L.C. 180 Ch D
[vi] Deverell  Ch. 340 CA (Civ Div).
[vii]  1 WLR 2793